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Pp. xvi,

Many academics, upon encountering a book on deference by a
leading legal theorist, would assume that the book was still another
contribution to a long and prominent debate about the existence (or
not) of an obligation to obey the law.1 But that would be a mistake. In
fact, this is a book not about obligation or obedience but about
deference, and it is precisely in that difference that the significance of
Philip Soper's2 book lies. Especially in law, where the Supreme Court
(sometimes) defers to the factual, legal, and even constitutional
determinations

of

Congress

and

administrative

agencies,

where

appellate courts (sometimes) defer to the findings of fact and law of
trial courts, and where trial courts (sometimes) defer to the judgments
of juries, conflating deference with obedience is plainly an error.3 It is

* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University.

1. The literature starts at least as early as Plato's Crito. PLATO, THE COLLECTED
DIALOGUES 27 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Land Cooper et al. trans., 1961).
It also includes CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL
DISOBEDIENCE (1992); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY (1979); Michael Davis, Smith, Gert, and the Obligation to Obey the Law, 20 S. J.
PHIL. 139 (1982); John Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary
Social Theory, l NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115 (1984); Gerald J. Postema,

Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 165 (1982); John
Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 3 (Sidney
Hook ed., 1964); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Law's Halo, in PHILOSOPHY
AND LAW 15 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987); Donald H. Regan, Reasons,

Authority, and the Meaning of "Obey": Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law, 3
CAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3 (1990); Frederick Schauer, The Questions of Authority, 81
GEO. L.J. 95 (1992); A. John Simmons, The Principle of Fair Play, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 307
.

(1979); and M.B.E. Smith, ls There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J.
950 (1973). For a recent and comprehensive analytic overview, see William A. Edmundson,
State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2004).
2. James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
3. The domains of deference are larger than even those listed in the text, and would
certainly include the "margin of appreciation" that international law gives to national
decisions, see Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 843 (1999), and perhaps even the vast area of private
lawmaking that takes place in the making of contracts, wills, trusts, and much else.
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the signature contribution of this book that it analyzes in great depth
and with impressive nuance a concept so central to law, yet so often
ignored because of the arguably disproportionate attention that legal
philosophy has paid to the question of obedience.
I.
Soper builds his analysis of and argument for deference4 by adding
an important gloss on an ongoing debate in contemporary legal
philosophy. This debate starts with the assumption that law is
necessarily normative.5 That is, law demands (or at least claims) our
obedience, so it is said,6 with the interesting debate being about
whether citizens do or do not have an obligation to do what the law
demands just because the law demands it.7
On both sides of this debate, there is a further assumption that the
obligation to obey the law, if it exists, is a content-independent one,8
and that what law claims is that there is indeed such a content
independent obligation to obey its directives. Law's normativity is thus
law's claim of authority in the strong sense, with law claiming that the
fact of a directive being a legal one is itself a (moral) reason (although

4. This Review will at times include fewer page references than is perhaps typical,
largely because I am, here, reconstructing an argument that Soper builds in a somewhat
nonlinear way. A lengthy Introduction analyzes in nonintroductory fashion the important
concepts and then proceeds to lay out major parts of the argument itself. See pp. 3-34. This is
followed by three substantial chapters dealing with issues of authority and of law's
normativity. See pp. 35-99. These chapters, as I will suggest presently, are of interest in their
own right, but they are also, and primarily, the foundation for Soper's central discussion of
deference. That discussion is itself built upon four separate examples of deference in
moderately discrete settings, see pp. 103-67, and it is only in the concluding part of the book
that the full account of deference finally emerges. Pp. 168-83.
5. See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); Gerald J.
Postema, The Normativity of Law, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE
INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 81 (Ruth Gavison ed. 1987).
6. See Jules L. Coleman, Second Thoughts and Other First Impressions, in ANALYZING
LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 257, 276 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); William A.
Edmundson, Social Meaning, Compliance Conditions, and Law's Claim to Authority, 15
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 51 (2002); Leslie Green, Law, Legitimacy, and Consent, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 795, 797 (1989); J. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 123, 131 (1984).
7. See supra note 1.
8. The locus classicus of the idea that content independence lies at the heart of the
concept of authority is H.L.A. HART, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in
ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243 (1982). Among the
sources of further discussion, explication, and critique are ROGER SHINER, NORM AND
NATURE: THE MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 52-53 (1992); R.A. Duff, Inclusion and
Exclusion, 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 247 (1998); Kenneth Einar Himma, H. L.A. Hart and
the Practical Difference Thesis, 6 LEGAL THEORY 1, 26-27 (2000); and P. Markwick,
Independent of Content, 9 LEGAL THEORY 43 (2003).
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not necessarily a conclusive one) for citizens to obey it.9 Consequently,
law asserts that its authority exists independently of the content, and
therefore the substantive correctness, of any particular directive. And
because the bite of such a claim, if the claimed obligation actually
exists, is most obvious when the law is perceived by its subject as
directing that which is wrong, it is central to understanding this view of
law's authority that accepting law's authority means accepting the (not
necessarily conclusive) obligation to do the (substantively) wrong
thing. And although some argue that there is in fact such an obligation
and others deny it, there is little disagreement that this is what law
claims,10 and that this is what an obligation to obey the law, if it
existed, would amount to.
Soper, however, wants to challenge this widespread agreement
about the kinds of claims that are implicit in law's normativity.11 It is
true, he argues, that there is a difference between a claim of authority
and a claim of correctness (pp.
the

idea

56-61 ). And in that sense Soper accepts

of content independence. But it is not true, he argues further,

that law necessarily claims authority in this content-independent way
as opposed to simply claiming correctness (as well as a right to
enforce) in a plainly content-dependent way (pp.

71-88).

A parent who

tells a child to go to bed at ten might at some point resort to "because

9. There are interesting questions to be raised about whether a concept, like law, can
claim anything, as opposed to the claims that might be made by particular individuals and
institutions at particular times. But the disembodied voice and attitude of the law is such an
omnipresent feature of contemporary legal theory that questioning it - and there is much to
be said for questioning it, see Andrei Marmor, Authorities and Persons, 1 LEGAL THEORY
337 (1995) - is best left for another occasion.
10. This is not to say that there is no disagreement whatsoever. Matthew Kramer and I,
for example, have in different ways offered a thin and thus more Austinian account of the
idea of law, one in which normativity then becomes a contingent but not a necessary feature
of legality. See MATIHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM (1999);
Frederick Schauer, Positivism Through Thick and Thin, in Analyzing Law, in ANALYZING
LAW: NEW ESSAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 65 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); Frederick Schauer, Critical
Notice, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 495 (1994) (reviewing ROGER SHINER, NORM AND NATURE: THE
MOVEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1992)). Soper responds to this line of argument, pp. 6271 but the issue is sufficiently tangential to my main theme in this Review that I will say no
more about the issue here except to note that Soper relies largely on Hart in believing the
,

Austinian account deficient for being unable to explain neither the concept of legal
obligation nor law's claim to authority. Neither Hart nor Soper, however, explain why state
based systems of enforced norms become disqualified as law whenever they fail to claim
authority or to generate obligation. Saying that the issue is conceptual and not empirical, p.
65, is true but not helpful, because the question is then one of determining which of the
contingent features of most legal systems shall be understood as essential, a determination
that in most of the existing debates seems to come down to little more than pounding one's
fist on the table and insisting that some feature of most legal systems just must be essential to
legality. Kramer and I do not deny that legal obligation is an interesting phenomenon
worthy of philosophical examination. What we deny is that its existence, whether claimed or
accepted or both, is a necessary component of any normative system entitled to the name
"law."
11. Soper does not, however, as do others, challenge the position that some concept of
normativity is an essential feature of law. See Hart, supra note 8.
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I said so,"12 but that is both a last resort13 and a move that is not, Soper
insists, implicit in the initial request, instruction, or even order. The
parent wants the child to go to bed at ten because ten is the right time
to go to bed, and not because the parent (necessarily) thinks that the
parent's order should be obeyed just because it is the parent's order.
Some or many parents may indeed think that, but as long as it is
possible to give (and enforce) an instruction that is solely a claim of
correctness and not a claim of authority, then the giving of an
instruction itself is not necessarily a claim of authority.
So too with law, Soper argues (pp.

71-88).

Although he does not

challenge the contemporary notion of what authority

is, he does

challenge the notion that law necessarily claims authority. Just as it is
possible for parents to make (and enforce) requests, issue instructions,
and give orders without necessarily claiming that those requests,
instructions, and orders should be followed because of their source
rather than because of their content, so too might law do the same
thing. Law might, and often does, claim simply that what it commands
is right, and thus might punish people, in effect, not for disobeying the
law but instead for doing the wrong thing. When I am punished for
driving in excess of the speed limit, Soper can be interpreted as
arguing, it could be that I am being punished not for disobeying a
posted speed limit but instead for driving too fast. Soper wisely refuses
to enter into a discussion of the frequency with which law makes such
claims, and that is because his argument is a conceptual and not an
empirical one. Even if law does at times rely on its authority and not
on its correctness, the fact that it could rely solely on correctness and
not for that reason be any less law-like or any less normative is the
distinctive contribution of this strand of the book's argument.14

12. See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 9 (1970).
13. The example is mine and not Soper's, but, as a childless only child, I do not intend
my empirical claims about parents or their children to carry much weight.
14. There is some possibility that Soper's analysis would weaken under the weight of
thinking more seriously about the intersection between the theory of rules and Soper's
theory of law. Law can avoid a claim of authority when it says to its subjects that they are
doing the wrong thing on this particular occasion, but if that is all that law claims, then we
are at a loss to account for all of the instances in which law claims the right to enforce a rule
whose application on some particular occasion might not serve the deepest purposes lying
behind the rule. Law can indeed claim the right to tell me that I should not drive too fast, but
when the law instead tells me that I should not carefully drive over the speed limit even on a
clear, dry, traffic-free day, on a good road, in a good car, it is telling me that I should obey
the rule just because it is a rule. And once law does this, then it is claiming just the kind of
content-independent authority that Soper argues is not an essential component of law's
claims. But once we see the claim of authority implicit in the claim that citizens should not
only do the right thing on particular occasions but also obey law's rules even in their areas of
under- and

over-inclusion,

see FREDERICK

SCHAUER,

PLAYING BY THE RULES: A

PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
(1991), the frequency of law's claims of authority grows substantially.
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II.
I do not wish to engage here the question whether Soper's
argument about the nature of law's claims is ultimately sound. That is
in part because

I am a conscientious objector to the entire debate

about the nature of law's normativity,15 but it is also because my focus
in this Review is elsewhere. And indeed not only for me but for Soper
himself in this book, the argument about normativity is simply the
precursor to the larger

argument about deference.

That larger

argument does start with the argument about normativity, because if
law can and does claim only that it is correct and not that it is
authoritative, then we need to rethink the question of the citizen's
attitude towards those claims. If law claims to be authoritative, we can
get our minds around the question of whether and when we as subjects
ought to recognize the content-independent authority of others, and
when we as subjects ought to recognize the content-independent
authority of the law. But if law does not even claim to be authoritative
in this content-independent sense, does that mean that we have no
obligation to obey it?
It is at this point in the argument that deference becomes crucial,
in part because Soper's position is that although law does not in fact
claim authority, it nevertheless has it, and people are morally bound to
follow its lead. And it is in supporting this conclusion that Soper relies
on and develops his broader account of deference. He acknowledges
that people often defer to the views of others, and indeed frequently
do so even when they perceive the views to which they are deferring as
mistaken. So for Soper the universe of acceding to the views of others
is not exhausted by acceptance of source-based authority, which he
rejects as necessary to legality, and simple persuasion, in which we
accede to the views of others because they have explicitly or implicitly
persuaded us that those views are correct. We must explain, he insists,
why people at times accede to views of others with which they
disagree, and do so under circumstances in which they do not (and
should not) accept that others have authority over them. This is the
phenomenon of deference, he argues, and it is the phenomenon that
remains in need of explanation.
If there is a genuine "Aha!" moment in this book, it is when, very
early on, Soper points out that we frequently defer to those who are
lower rather than higher on some scale of authority (pp. xii-xiii). Soper
uses the examples of a higher court deferring to the findings of a lower
one, and of one spouse deferring to the views of another, and we can
add others to this list. Teachers sometimes defer to their students,
parents sometimes defer to their children, and supervisors frequently

15.

See note

10, supra.
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defer to their employees, all in the face of actual belief by the deferrer
that the decision being deferred to is erroneous. At times such
deference is purely instrumental and strategic. Parents may defer to·
their children so that the children can learn from their own mistakes,
or because deference is more conducive to family harmony and the
avoidance of tears and screams. But at times something else is going
on, and it is Soper's basic point that people often defer to their
hierarchical subordinates and to their equals for reasons that are not
simply strategic or instrumental.
With

his simple

but extremely

important

observation

about

downward (or parallel) deference, Soper uncouples the concept of
deference from the bulk of the literature on obedience. In doing so,
however, he imposes upon himself an obligation to explain why, if not
for reasons of authority, and if not acting simply instrumentally,
people would defer to the views of others even when they think those
views wrong. The meat of this book is Soper's acceptance of this
obligation, and his arguments in favor of the moral case for deference.
And most of those arguments flow out of Soper's discussions of
deference to the terms of a contract or the content of a promise (pp.

103-39),

deference to the views of others in the context of what is

called the principle of fair play (pp.

140-58),

and deference to the

commands and requirements of the state, whether expressed in formal
law or otherwise (pp.

159-67).

What joins all of these examples of

deference, argues Soper, is that combination of self-respect and
respect for others that comes from imagining oneself in the position of
the

agent

whose views

invite

deference

even

in

the

face

of

disagreement. Imagining oneself in this way is not, for Soper, strictly
or even largely instrumental. For him it is not just a question of things
going better for everyone, on balance or in the aggregate, if we all
behave in this way. And thus it is not a simple quid-pro-quo issue (nor
a more complex variation) familiar from the literature on coordination
problems and cooperative behavior.16 Nor is putting oneself in the
position of another a matter of showing actual respect for the
particular individuals or institutions to whom or to which we defer.
Such causes for deference may indeed exist, but for Soper deference

169-72), and is thus better
explained by the deference that we give to others not because, or at
goes beyond "personal association" (pp.

least not only because, of who

they are, and not even only because of

our actual relationship with them, but because we can, we do, and we
should imagine ourselves in their shoes doing the best we can to serve
some larger good in the context of a community, in the broadest sense,
of which we are both members. Soper's noninstrumental argument for

16. For some of this literature applied to the question of the nature of law and legal

M.

2 RATIO JURIS 97 (1989); Postema,
2 RATIO JURIS 105 (1989).

obligation, see John
Finnis, Law as Co-ordination,
supra note 5; and Noel B. Reynolds, Law as Convention,
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deference is thus partly an argument from self-respect, partly an
argument from respect for others, and overarchingly an argument
from community (p. 172).
III.
Although Soper's moral perspective on deference is imaginative,
important, and arguably right,17 it is still in some sense only part of the
picture, and a part that may fail to explain many of the most important
systemic and institutional features of law. As William Twining, more
than anyone else, has insisted,18 legal theory can only be understood by
appreciating the

standpoint of a particular theory. Just as a Holmesian

perspective on the "bad man"19 or on law-as-prediction20 may explain
much of how subjects see the law but almost nothing about how legal
actors such as judges see the law,21 and just as a theory aimed at actual
or prospective lawyers wondering about their obligations inside the
legal system may be very different from a theory designed for those
who must evaluate the legal system from the outside,22 so too do most
theories of law or accounts of particular features of law make much
more sense from some standpoints than they do from others.
Once we see the unavoidable significance of standpoint, we can see
that Soper's standpoint, like the standpoint of so much of legal and
moral theory, is the standpoint of the autonomous moral agent
deciding, on largely moral grounds, what to

do. This agent, the

17. It is possible, however, that Soper moves a bit quickly from the existence of the
practice of deference to the conclusion that there must be a moral argument supporting it.
Numerous social practices, like alternate side of the street parking and packaging eggs in
quantities of twelve, are the product of history, serendipity, or pure pragmatism, and there is
nothing immoral or amoral about concluding that morality does not lie at the foundation of
all of our social practices. Much of the actual practice of deference may be of this character,
and, like the classic person with a hammer who sees every problem as a nail, Soper may be
guilty of assuming that morality is the principal tool we need to employ, to explain, or to
justify the institutions and practices of deference as we know them.
18. See, e.g., WILLIAM TwINING & DAYID MIERS, How TO Do THINGS WITH RULES: A
PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION 64-71 (2d ed. 1982). For application of Twining's views, see
David A. Schum, Alternative Views of Argument Construction from a Mass of Evidence, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 1461 (2001).
19. "If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man . . .
. " O.W. Holmes, The Path o f the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
20. See Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998).
21. This is the standard critique first by Hart, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LA w
124-54 (2d ed. 1994), and then by Ronald Dworkin, RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 3437 (1986). For a broad discussion of the place of Realist claims within larger jurisprudential
traditions, see Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, 111 ETHICS
278 (2001).
22. See Frederick Schauer, Fuller's Internal Point of View, 13 LAW & PHIL. 285 (1994);
see also Brian z. Tamanaha, The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a "Practice"
in Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 LAW & Soc'y REV. 163 (1996).
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omnipresent figure in modem and not-so-modem jurisprudence, is the
addressee of various rules, norms, and other directives, but must in the
final analysis make her own moral decision about what she is to decide
and what action she is to take. Soper's puzzle is thus the puzzle of why
this autonomous agent, having decided that the right thing to do is to
<j>, will then herself make the decision to defer to the decision of
another, the import of which is that the agent will not <I> even though
she believes it right to <j>. But note that in all of this there is only one
important decisionmaker, the agent herself. She is deciding what is
right; she is deciding that the decision of another is mistaken; and she
is deciding that she will (or will not) defer to that mistaken decision. In
important respects, it's all about me. And even though Soper's
perspective on what that autonomous moral agent should do is shaped
by how that agent should view the decisions of actual and hypothetical
others within some shared community, it remains a persistently single
minded view.
I say "persistently single-minded" because there are other
perspectives, and there are other standpoints. Consider, for example,
the standpoint of one whose decision might be thought to be mistaken
by someone else - call her Alice - and whose decision might
nevertheless be the object of deference by someone else. Under such
circumstances should Alice not reach the decision she thinks best
because she would not want to put another person - call him Zeke in the position of having to defer to a decision that he, Zeke, thinks
wrong? Should Alice therefore engage in anticipatory deference,
deferring to a decision by Zeke that she thinks wrong and thus making
what she thinks is the wrong decision in the first instance because she,
Alice, wants to defer to Zeke's decision and thus not impose upon
Zeke, the deferrer, the burden of reaching a decision he thinks
mistaken? Or should Alice instead respect (defer to) Zeke's expected
decision to defer by simply reaching what she believes to be the best
decision? In the large, therefore, should Alice's behavior be different
- in one way or another - when she expects that behavior to be the
object of deference as compared to when she does not expect that
behavior to be the object of deference?
But of course there are more standpoints than just those of the
deferrer

and

the

deferee.

Perhaps even more important

is the

standpoint of the institutional designer. Suppose as a member of
Congress, or as a member of a Federal Rules Advisory Committee,
Katherine believes that appellate judges, having read and internalized
Soper's book, are likely to defer extensively, on questions of fact and
also on questions of law, to the decisions of trial judges. And suppose
Katherine believes as well that trial judges, partly because they have a
much heavier workload and partly because they have, on average, less
judicial experience, will make systematically worse decisions, including
systematically worse moral decisions, than appellate judges. As a

May 2005]
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member of Congress or the Rules Committee, therefore, Katherine
believes that Soperian practices of deference, although embodying
admirable sentiments on the part of appellate judges, will at the same
time produce systematically morally worse decisions, and will do so to
the detriment of the litigants and to the detriment of the judicial
system. Under those circumstances should Katherine in her special
official role strive to create a system of nondeference, or at least lesser
deference, knowing that this will benefit countless litigants and the
legal system as a whole? Or should Katherine instead engage in
second-order deference, deferring to the views about deference of the
appellate judiciary, not because she believes those views to be correct,
but instead because all of the arguments for first-order deference as to
matters of substance apply as well to second-order deference as to the
question of deference itself?
I do not mean to be overly cute about this. The second-order issues
are undoubtedly there, but there are always plausible stopping points,
and the view that here is a "meta" argument about everything easily
collapses into a shallow debater's point.23 But the larger point is not a
point about second-order deference. Rather, it is a point about
standpoint, and about the fact that the question about deference is not
only about what the autonomous agent should do, and maybe not
even primarily about what the autonomous agent should do, but is
also about the behavior of other actors, and especially about the way
in which the actor who is an institutional designer should take
deference into account when designing decision-making institutions.
IV.
With Larry Alexander,24 I have been exploring in a series of books
and articles what he calls "The Gap"25 and what I call "The
Asymmetry of Authority."26 The idea in both, and an idea that Soper
himself has resisted,27 is that the question of authority looks very
different from the perspective of the authority than it does from the
perspective of the subject, and that it is perfectly sensible to imagine

23. The obligatory citation is to Leon Lipson, who said, "Anything you can do, I can do
meta." A.A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2
(1979).
24. See Larry Alexander & Frederick
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).

Schauer,

On

Extrajudicial

Constitutional

25. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY 695 (1991).
26. SCHAUER, supra note 14, at 128-34.
27. PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984); Philip Soper, Law's Normative Claims, in
THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 215 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
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that from the perspective of the subject there is no good reason to
respect an authority as an authority but that from the perspective

of

the authority there may nevertheless be good reasons, moral and
otherwise, for the authority to try to create a system of incentives,
coercion, or persuasion in order to get the subject to do things that the
subject, rightly from the subject's perspective, should see no reason to
do. Although we have no shortage of moral theories addressed to the
question of the morality of confronting authority, we await the well
worked-out theory addressed to the morality of imposing authority,
especially in the context of a belief by the authority that the putative
subjects of that authority are likely to cause harm to third parties.
Much the same applies to deference. The question of deference
looks very different from the standpoint of those who give it than it
does from the standpoint of those who receive it. Soper's extremely
important book, in putting deference on the agenda of legal theory
and in offering powerful arguments for engaging in it, has helped us
enormously in understanding why autonomous moral agents do and
should defer to the decisions of others. But on the questions of how
autonomous agents as recipients of deference should behave, and how
our institutions of deference ought to be designed, we await a quite
different book from a quite different perspective. Indeed, at the
conclusion of this book, Soper makes clear that his project is a moral
one and that he is not engaging in empirical contingent policy analysis
about the design of "artificially promulgated rules" to specify the
exact contours of deference in any particular institutional setting (p.

175). But even if the inquiry is a moral one, it remains the case that the
perspective of the autonomous agent confronted with the directives or
decisions of others is not the only moral standpoint. What to do as the
object of deference can itself be determined or guided by moral
factors, and so too with more pervasive questions of institutional
design. And as long as it is possible that the moral considerations
governing deference will themselves look different from these other
standpoints, then the comprehensive work on the morality of the
practice of deference remains to be written. Soper's book, as a
rigorous scholarly examination of deference from the point of view of
an autonomous agent contemplating deferring to a decision she thinks
erroneous, is a vital part of what is to be hoped will develop into a
large and rich literature on deference. But it is to be hoped as well that
at least some of that literature will recognize that deference, like
numerous other social practices that have moral components and that
can be evaluated and defended morally, may look very different from
different

vantage

points.

It

is

a

trite

slogan

in

the

world

of

policymaking that "where you stand depends on where you sit," but to
say that the same is true of morality is not to be a moral relativist. It is
only to say that nonrelative morality itself may play out differently in
the context of

different roles, different decisions, and different
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standpoints. With respect to deference, the moral inquiry into when
and why to defer is a vital question. But it is not the only question.

